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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
ANN L. WASSERMAN, SHIRLEY 
RANDAZZO, AND THE HONORABLE 
MICHAEL MURPHY, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 92-0259 
Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE MICHAEL MURPHY 
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3) (j). This appeal may be transferred to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This appeal seeks the reversal of a Summary Judgment entered 
in favor of Judge Murphy on April 5, 1991. The material findings 
of fact set forth in the Summary Judgment are not in dispute. 
Rather, Plaintiff challenges the trial court's conclusions of law 
regarding each of the following issues: 
1. Whether Plaintiff waived the procedural due process 
rights which are the basis of this action. 
2. Whether Plaintiff's claims against Judge Murphy are 
barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. 
3. Whether this action is barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
Summary judgment is proper if no genuine issue of material 
fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & 
Water, Inc. , 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990). This Court reviews the lower 
court's conclusions of law for correctness, according no particular 
deference to the lower court. CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, 
Inc.. 772 P.2d 967 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 7. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of a Summary Judgment granted in favor of 
Judge Murphy on April 5, 1991. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff is a member of the Utah State Bar. Plaintiff 
formerly represented Frank Randazzo in a divorce action entitled 
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Randazzo v. Randazzo, Third District Court Case No. D-88-4130 ("the 
divorce action"). 
2. Defendant Wasserman is also a member of the Utah State 
Bar. Defendant Wasserman represented Ms. Randazzo in the divorce 
action. 
3. Defendant Murphy ("Judge Murphy") is a duly appointed 
judge of the Third Judicial District Court. Judge Murphy presided 
over the divorce action. 
4. The divorce action was tried on August 1, 1989. The 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce 
were signed by Judge Murphy on September 6, and entered on that 
same date. 
5. Also on September 6, Plaintiff filed a Withdrawal of 
Counsel. The Withdrawal of Counsel indicated that a hearing to 
determine whether Mr. Randazzo should be held in contempt had been 
set for September 13. Addendum, Exhibit "A". 
6. On September 13, although the hearing was scheduled to 
begin at 3:00 pm, neither Mr. Randazzo nor Plaintiff appeared. At 
Judge Murphy's request, Mr. Randazzo was telephonically contacted 
by Judge Murphy's clerk and appeared without counsel at 
approximately 4:30 pm. R. at 82. Mr. Randazzo represented that he 
had not received a copy of the Withdrawal and Counsel and was 
unaware of the hearing. R. at 82. Judge Murphy declined to hold 
Mr. Randazzo in contempt, but awarded Ms. Randazzo $430 for her 
attorney's fees in bringing the contempt matter before the court, 
and instructed Mr. Randazzo as follows: 
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THE COURT: Let me tell you what you are going 
to do. Before you pay Mr. Barnard one dime 
more, you will pay to Ms. Wasserman for her 
fees in regard to this hearing $430, which 
will be, in my mind, — listen to me, Mr. 
Randazzo — a direct credit for the amounts 
that you owe Mr. Barnard. 
My understanding of what has occurred here as 
a result of Mr. Barnard's withdrawal, and 
based on your representations to me, and at 
least some verification that I've seen of this 
transcript and when it was mailed, this is not 
entirely your fault, Mr. Randazzo. 
And I think that neither you nor Ms. Randazzo 
should be out of Ms. Randazzo's attorney's 
fees, and the only way I know of rectifying 
that is by having Mr. Barnard pay Ms. 
Wasserman's fees in the manner in which I 
indicated. 
R. at 92. 
7. On September 18, in response to the proposed order, 
Plaintiff filed an Affidavit setting forth his communications with 
Mr. Randazzo up until the date of his withdrawal. R. at 114 - 118; 
Addendum, Exhibit "B». 
8. On September 20, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate Order 
of Sanctions and Objection to Order, claiming that he had been 
deprived of his constitutional due process rights because Judge 
Murphy had not provided him with notice and an opportunity to be 
heard. R. at 111 - 113; Addendum, Exhibit "C". 
9. On September 21, Plaintiff filed a Request for Hearing on 
his Motion. R. at 119, 120; Addendum, Exhibit "D". 
10. Judge Murphy signed the order arising from the September 
13 hearing on October 12. R. at 138 - 140; Addendum, Exhibit "E". 
However, he instructed his clerk not to enter the order until 
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Plaintiff had an opportunity to have a hearing on the attorney's 
fee issue. 
11. On November 14, Plaintiff represented to Judge Murphy's 
clerk that he did not intend to have a hearing. Consequently, the 
clerk created a minute entry and entered the order on that same 
date. R. at 137A, 138; Addendum, Exhibit ,fF". 
12. On November 21, while appearing in Ward v. Butcher, Third 
District Court Case No. C-88-4883, Plaintiff testified that he had 
spoken with Judge Murphy's clerk about the order and that he told 
her, "Go ahead and file it. I'll take care of it in another way." 
R. at 130. 
13. Plaintiff then filed a civil rights suit against 
Defendants Randazzo, Wasserman and Murphy in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah ("the federal action"). On 
May 9, 1990, the federal action was dismissed by Judge Clarence 
Brimmer for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and because of 
judicial immunity. R. at 142 - 150; Addendum, Exhibit "G". 
14. Plaintiff then filed this suit, alleging the same cause 
of action raised in the federal action. 
15. Defendant Murphy filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
which was granted by Judge Pat B. Brian on April 5, 1991. R. at 
345 - 358; Addendum, Exhibit "H". After the matter was concluded 
as to the other defendants, Plaintiff filed this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The present claims against Judge Murphy are barred by the 
doctrines of waiver, judicial immunity, and res judicata. 
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Consequently, the Summary Judgment, granted on each of those three 
grounds, should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE — PLAINTIFF WAIVED HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
BY FAILING TO PURSUE RELIEF FROM THE ORDER 
IN THE DIVORCE ACTION 
Although there is a presumption against waivers of 
constitutional rights, the presumption can be overcome by a showing 
of a valid waiver. Pitts v. Bd. of Education, 869 F.2d 555, 557 
(10th Cir. 1989). The test is whether the totality of the 
circumstances indicates an intentional abandonment or 
relinquishment of a known constitutional right. Johnson v. Zerbst. 
304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938); Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 
477, 101A S.Ct. 1880 (1981). 
In this matter, Plaintiff's complaint claims that Judge 
Murphy's order deprived him of his constitutional right to be heard 
on the issue of payment of attorney's fees by Mr. Randazzo. 
Plaintiff is a licensed attorney, and is familiar with the process 
for objecting to proposed court orders. In fact, Plaintiff filed 
a Motion to Vacate Order of Sanctions and Objection to Order, and 
a Request for Hearing, in an initial attempt to obtain relief from 
the order. However, he later intentionally abandoned the process 
by informing Judge Murphy's clerk that he did not wish to have a 
hearing because he would "take care of it in another way." He knew 
the consequences of that statement when he made it. He knowingly 
and voluntarily determined to forego his right to a hearing in the 
divorce action in order to challenge the order in federal court. 
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His actions resulted in a valid waiver of the right he claims was 
denied him by Judge Murphy, and a civil rights complaint to remedy 
the loss of that right cannot therefore stand. Weinrauch v. Park 
City, 751 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1984); Riaains v. Bd. of Regents of 
University of Nebraska, 790 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1986). 
POINT TWO — PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST JUDGE MURPHY 
ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY 
It is a well established principle of our judicial system that 
judges are immune from liability for acts committed in their 
judicial capacities. Although judicial immunity is not absolute, 
a judge is entitled to immunity if he has not acted in clear 
absence of all jurisdiction and if the act is a judicial one. 
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (1978). An act is 
"judicial" if it is a function normally performed by a judge and if 
the parties dealt with the judge in his official capacity. 
Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985). 
The injury complained of by Plaintiff arises from Judge 
Murphy's decision in a post-trial contempt proceeding. Presiding 
over such proceedings, making oral rulings, granting attorney's 
fees in such proceedings, and signing orders, are all actions 
consistent with the conduct normally engaged in by district court 
judges of this state. Judge Murphy was acting in his official 
capacity when he engaged in each of the specified actions. 
As noted by Plaintiff, judicial immunity is not a bar to 
prospective injunctive relief. Pulliam v. Allenr 466 U.S. 522, 
104A S.Ct. 1970 (1984). Unlike the plaintiffs in Pulliam however, 
Plaintiff here is seeking to change a previously entered court 
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order, not enjoin the entry of such orders in the future. In 
Navaio Nation v. District Court for Utah County, 624 F.Supp. 130 
(D. Utah 1985), Judge Greene granted summary judgment in favor of 
the state district court, holding that the plaintiffs7 action was 
barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. He stated: 
Although the United States Supreme Court 
recently found that judicial immunity is not a 
bar to prospective injunctive relief against a 
judicial officer, nor to the award of 
attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in 
cases where prospective injunctive relief is 
granted, the question presented here is 
whether this case is appropriate for 
collateral prospective relief. Unlike the 
respondents in Pulliam, who sought to enjoin a 
Magistrate from requiring bond for a 
nonincarcerable offense, the plaintiffs in 
[t]his case do not seek the prospective 
enjoining of an ongoing unconstitutional 
practice, but rather seek to reverse a final 
judgment which resulted from evidentiary 
hearings in a specific case. The plaintiffs' 
request is more in the nature of appellate 
review of the State Court decision. 
Therefore, this Court finds that the narrow 
exception to the doctrine of judicial immunity 
as articulated in the Pulliam decision does 
not apply . . . . Citations omitted. 
624 F.Supp. at 137. 
Plaintiff here, like the plaintiffs in Navaio Nation, attempts 
to come within the Pulliam exception, but in reality, only seeks 
the reversal of Judge Murphy's order. Such relief is barred by the 
doctrine of judicial immunity. 
POINT THREE — PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST JUDGE MURPHY 
ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA 
In Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988), this 
Court explained the issue preclusion branch of res judicata as 
follows: 
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Under the rules of issue preclusion, the 
adjudication of an issue bars its relitigation 
in another action only if four requirements 
are met. First, the issue in both cases must 
be identical. Second, the judgment must be 
final with respect to that issue. Third, the 
issue must have been fully, fairly, and 
competently litigated in the first action. 
Fourth, the party who is precluded from 
litigating the issue must be either a party to 
the first action or a privy of a party. 
In the present case, as in the federal action, the issue of 
judicial immunity was raised, briefed, argued and submitted to the 
court for decision, and the dismissal of the federal action was 
final with respect to that issue. The district court found that 
the relief sought by Plaintiff was "clearly retroactive and not 
prospective," and was therefore barred by the doctrine of judicial 
immunity. This action is therefore barred by res judicata. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Murphy respectfully submits that the Summary 
Judgment should be affirmed. 
DATED this 2d day of October, 1992. 
Colin R. Winchester 
Counsel for Appellee Murphy 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 2d day of October, 1992, I hand-
delivered four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee Murphy to each of the following: 
Brian M. Barnard, Esq, 
Utah Legal Clinic 
214 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Ann L. Wasserman, Esq. 
Littlefield and Peterson 
426 South 800 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Colin R. Winchester 
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Withdrawal of Counsel (divorce action) 
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EXHIBIT "A 
cy BRIAN M. BARNARD USB // 0215 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for FRANK A. RANDAZZO 
Defendant 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
STATE OF UTAH SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SHIRLEY N. RANDAZZO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANK A. RANDAZZO, 
Defendant. 
WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL 
and NOTICE 
Civil No. 88-4904130 DA 
(Hon. M. MURPHY) 
BRIAN M. BARNARD and C. DANE NOLAN of the Utah Legal 
Clinic hereby withdrawal as counsel of record for the 
defendant in the above captioned matter. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN to the defendant that there is a 
hearing in this matter set for September 13, 1989 at the 
hour of 3:00 p.m. before the Hon. Michael R. Murphy. 
DATED this 5th day of September. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing VJITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL and NOTICE to: 
ANN L. WASSERMANN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
FRANK RANDAZZO 
Defendant 
6458 South 1140 West 
Murray, Utah 84123 
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service on the 
5th day of SEPTEMBER, 1989. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
FVWTPTT "P" 
:M en 
^ r > i . ••• — 
- i I > 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB // 0215 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Former Attorney for FRANK A. RANDAZZO 
Defendant 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 328-9532 
3Y 
!,' 4
 U2 P»I »-r 
'^j&LJUtete 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
STATE OF UTAH SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SHIRLEY N. RANDAZZO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANK A. RANDAZZO, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
Civil No. 88-4904130 DA 
(Hon. M. MURPHY) 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT*LAKE COUNTY 
SS, 
BRIAN M. BARNARD having been duly sworn upon oath 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the former counsel for the defendant in the 
above captioned matter. I am an attorney admitted to 
practice in this Court. 
""Hi 
2. During the afternoon of August 2, 1989, after the 
oral ruling by the Court in this action, I had a telephone 
conversation with the defendant Frank Randazzo. In that 
conversation I read him my notes from the courtfs ruling. 
3. In that phone conversation, I specifically told him 
that he was obligated to bring current the indebtedness to 
the Cyprus Credit Union and that he had to make the payment 
due in late August. 
4. On August 7, 1989, I received a letter from plain-
tiff's counsel (a copy is attached). On that date I mailed 
a copy of that letter to the defendant Frank Randazzo at 
6458 South 1140 West, Murray, Utah 84123. Included with 
that copy was a note to call me. The defendant did not call 
me in reponse to that note. 
5. On or about August 18, 1989, I received proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce in this matter from plaintiff's counsel. On August 
19, 1989 I mailed a copy of those pleadings to the defendant 
Frank Randazzo at 6458 South 1140 West, Murray, Utah 84122. 
Included with that copy was a note to review the documents 
and to call me. Defendant did not call me in response to 
that note. 
6. After the oral ruling and decision in this matter, 
I ordered a transcript of that ruling. I received that from 
this Courtfs stenographic reporter after August 18, 1989. 
m i l 1 x 
On August 23, 1989, shortly after receipt, I mailed a cozy 
of that transcript to the defendant at his Murray address. 
7. On or about September 1, 1989, I received an 
Affidavit of Plaintiff, a Motion for Contempt and a Notice 
of Hearing in this matter from plaintiff's counsel. On 
September 1, 1989 I mailed a copy of those pleadings to the 
defendant Frank Randazzo at his Murray address. Included 
with those copies was a note to review the documents and to 
call me. 
8. On or about September 5, 1989 I received a phone 
call from the defendant in which he acknowledged receipt of 
the Motion for Contempt and accompanying documents. He 
complained to me in that conversation about his wifefs 
continuing refusal to deliver his property to him, her 
recently taking his horse to a pasture three hundred (300 
miles away, etc. In that conversation I told him that r-.y 
office could no longer represent him. 
9. In that September 5, 1989 conversation, I told hir. 
that he had to appear on September 13, 1989 for the hearing;. 
10. On September 5, 1989 I prepared a withdrawal of 
counsel and mailed it to the defendant at 6458 South 1140 
West, Murray, Utah 84123. Included in that withdrawal is a 
notice of the hearing on September 13, 1989. 
n!i1 1 ^  
11. Since May 2, 1989 the only home address that I 
have had for the defendant is 6458 South 1140 West, Murray, 
Utah 84123. 
12. Each of the documents as set forth above mailed to 
the defendant was sent to the defendantfs Murray address 
with sufficient postage. None of the documents mailed as 
set forth above have been returned to me by the Postal 
Service. 
DATED this 18th day of September, 1989. 
BRIAN 
Affiant 
/ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME ON THE DATE ABOVE WRI7TE" 
My ctotnm. expires: mdh 
Residing at Salt'Lake Cour.-v 
STATE OF UTAH 
• IH117 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN M. BARNARD to: 
ANN L. WASSERMANN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
FRANK RANDAZZO 
Defendant Pro Se 
6458 South 1140 West 
Murray, Utah 84123 
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service cr. the 
18th day of SEPTEMBER, 1989. 
UTAH- LEGAL CLINIC 
BRIAN M. (BARNARD 
Former Attorney for Defendant 
illlU 
T T X T T T T T M - r r i If j~\ it 
» U . W . 
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BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215
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UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Former Attorney for FRANK A. RANDAZZO 
Defendant 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Telephone: (801) 328-9532 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
0 STATE OF UTAH SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SHIRLEY N. RANDAZZO, /foOTION TO VACATE 
: ^RDER OF SANCTIONS 
and 
Plaintiff, OBJECTION TO ORDER 
vs. 
FRANK A. RANDAZZO, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 88-4904130 DA 
(Hon. M. MURPHY) 
BRIAN M. BARNARD former counsel for the defendant in 
the above captioned matter objects and moves this Court as 
follows: 
1. This Court ruled on September 13, 1989 that 
sanctions should be imposed upon former counsel for the 
defendant. 
2. Counsel for the plaintiff served upon former 
counsel for the defendant a copy of the proposed order base 
upon the hearing of September 13, 1989. 
3. The Court ruled and imposed sanctions without 
notice to former counsel. 
4. The Court ruled and imposed sanctions without 
allowing former counsel to present evidence or explain his 
conduct. 
5. The Court ruled and imposed sanctions based on 
false or incomplete information, 
6. This objection and motion are supported by the 
Affidavit of Brian M. Barnard dated September 18, 1989 filed 
herewith. 
7. Former counsel for the defendant gave notice to 
defendant of the Courtfs ruling of August 2, 1989 in a 
timely and appropriate manner. Former counsel for the 
defendant gave notice to defendant of his obligations based 
upon the Court's ruling in a timely and appropriate manner. 
8. Entering an order of sanctions against former 
counsel, without notice and without an opportunity to be 
heard constitutes a deprivation of property and liberty 
without due process. 
. if 1 1 1 ~t 
WHEREFORE, Brian M. Barnard objects to the proposed 
order and imposition of sanctions against him and moves this 
Court to vacate the oral ruling and not enter the proposed 
order based upon that oral ruling. 
DATED this 18th day of September, 1989. 
BRIAN M.(BARNARD 
Former Counsel for 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing OBJECTION & MOTION TO VACATE to: 
ANN L. WASSERMANN Attorney for Plaintiff 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
FRANK RANDAZZO Defendant Pro Se 
6458 South 1140 West 
Murray, Utah 84123 
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service on the 
18th day of SEPTEMBER, 1989. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
'BRIAN M. BARNARD 
Former At/torney for Defendant 
C V T T T n T T ffTXH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB // 0215 :- -^ttU. ^ 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Former Attorney for FRANK A. RANDAZZO 
Defendant 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
STATE OF UTAH SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SHIRLEY N. RANDAZZO, REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANK A. RANDAZZO, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 88-4904130 DA 
(Hon. M. MURPHY) 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, former counsel for the defendant in 
the above captioned matter hereby requests this court to set 
for hearing the motion brought by Brian M. Barnard to vacate 
the cftrder of sanctions entered against him and to set for 
hearing Brian M. Barnard's objection to the proposed order 
based on the hearing of September 13, 1989. 
DATED this jfos— day of September, 1989. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing REQUEST FOR HEARING to: 
ANN L. WASSERMANN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
FRANK RANDAZZO 
Defendant Pro Se 
6458 South 1140 West 
Murray, Utah 84123 
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service on the 
, ^ ^ 7 day of SEPTEMBER, 1989. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
FYUTOTT "T^ » 
Third Judicial Gi^nc: 
NOV 1 h 1983 
ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395 
Attorney for Plaintiff ^^^VUK^^JV 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON *\-jLlQdLa^iOdck.? 
426 South 500 East L -^-•.v.._. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
SHIRLEY N. RANDAZZO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FRANK A. RANDAZZO, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
"N 
Case No. 884904130DA 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
-ooOoo 
Plaintiff's Motion for Finding of Contempt came on for 
hearing on September 13, 1989, at the hour of 3:00 p.m., the 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy presiding. Plaintiff appeared in 
person and was represented by counsel, Ann L. Wassermann, Esq. 
initially, Defendant did not appear. The Court made telephonic 
contact with the Defendant, who subsequently appeared. He was 
not represented by counsel. The Court having considered the 
pleadings, the proffer of counsel for the Plaintiff, and the com-
ments of the Defendant, and it appearing to the Court that the 
Defendant did not receive notice of the hearing, and it further 
appearing that Defendant's former counsel did not give Defendant 
-1-
timely notice of the details of the Court's decision as announced 
on August 2, 1989, and it further appearing that Defendant's 
counsel did not forward to Defendant copies of the proposed 
Findings of Fact and Decree of Divorce, and it further appearing 
that the Defendant had made good faith efforts to comply with the 
Court's orders upon learning of them, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Finding of Contempt is 
denied. 
2. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the Findings cf 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce previously 
entered in this matter to provide that Defendant shall be 
required to reimburse her for all monies expended by her as a 
result of Defendant's failure to comply with previous Court 
orders requiring him to make payments to the credit union. Those 
amounts shall be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff on or before 
December 13, 1989. 
3. Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $4 30.00 
as and for attorney's fees incurred by Plaintiff in connection 
with this contempt proceeding. The Defendant is ordered not to 
pay any money to his former counsel, Brian Barnard, until the 
award of attorney's fees is paid to counsel for the Plaintiff. 
Further, any monies paid by Defendant to counsel for Plaintiff in 
satisfaction of this obligation shall be credited, dollar for 
-2-
HU139 
dollar against Defendant's outstanding balance with his prior 
counsel, Brian Barnard. 
DATED this Jl/ day of September, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
HON. MICHAEL R. MURPHY/ 
District Court Judge ' 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order, this IT 
day of September, 
1989. to: 
Mr. Frank Randazzo 
6458 South 1140 West 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Mr. Brian M. Barnard, Esq. 
Utah Legal Clinic 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
38336 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RANDAZZO, SHIRLEY N 
VS 
RANDAZZO, FRANK A 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE'NUMBER 884904130 DA 
DATE 11/14/89 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R MURPHY 
COURT- REPORTER 
COURT CLERK MPB 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. WASSERMANN, ANN L. 
D. ATTY. BARNARD, BRIAN M. 
BASED ON REPRESENTATION OF DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL THAT HE DOES NOT 
INTEND TO HAVE HEARING ON OBJECTIONS TO ORDER AND AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, THE ORDER AND FINDINGS 
SIGNED OCTOBER 12, 1989 ARE FILED TODAY. 
FXHTRTT "G 
FILED IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT DISTRICT Of in^ 
BY. 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
09»UTYCLBfc 
ANN L. WASSERMANN, 
SHIRLEY RANDAZZO, and 
THE HON- MICHAEL MURPHY, 
Judge of the Third District 
Court: in and for Salt Lake 
Counry, State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
NO. 89-C-1042-B 
UHi^^wi^ifi] 
MAY - S 1990 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE 
OF THE COURTS 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This matter comes before the Court on the motion for judgment 
on the pleadings of the plaintiff and on the motions for summary 
judgment of defendants Ann L. Wasserman and Michael Murphy. The 
Courr, having reviewed the pleadings, having heard the arguments 
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now FINDS and 
ORDERS as follows: 
Background 
Plaintiff Brian M. Barnard is an attorney who represented 
Frank Randazzo in a divorce action tried before the defendant, 
Michael Murphy, Judge of the Third District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County. The defendant, Ann Wassermann, is an attorney who 
represented Shirley Randazzo in the divorce action. Shirley 
Randazzo is also named as a defendant in this action, and the Court 
has entered default against her for her failure to answer the 
complaint. 
Frank Randazzo was required to make certain payments to 
Shirley Randazzo pursuant to the divorce decree. Those payments 
were not made, and Shirley Randazzo moved to hold Frank Randazzo 
in contempt. Neither Frank Randazzo nor Barnard appeared at the 
time set for the hearing on the motion September 13, 1989. The 
court noted that Barnard had withdrawn as counsel for Frank 
Randazzo September 6, 1989, giving notice of that withdrawal to 
Randazzo, to the Court, and to Wasserman. Randazzo appeared at the 
hearing pro se an hour and thirty-five minutes late. Upon hearing 
his side of the story, Judqe Murphy ordered Randazzo to pay any 
attorney fees due Barnard to Wasserman. 
The court ordered Wasserman to draw up an order reflecting its 
THE COURT: Let me tell you what you are going 
to do. Before you pay Mr. Barnard one dime 
more, you will pay to Ms. Wassermam for her 
feesin regard to this hearing^$430, which will 
be, in my mind, ^ — listen to m^&r^Kandazzo -
- a direct credit for the amounts that you owe 
Mr. Barnard. 
Randazzo v. Randazzo. No. 88-4904130DA, Sept. 13, 1989 
at 29. 
2 
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decision, which Wasserman did. She mailed a copy of the Order to 
Barnard, and he filed his motion to vacate the sanctions and 
objections to the order, along with an affidavit and a request for 
a hearing, on September 20, 1989. On November 21, 1989, at a 
hearing in an unrelated matter in which Barnard represented one of 
the parties, Judge Murphy inquired of Barnard whether he intended 
to file suit against him, "because if I'm a party to a lawsuit like 
that I don't see how I can sit on this case...11 Ward v. Butcher, 
No. C 88-448 3, Nov. 21, 1989, transcript at 2. Judge Murphy's 
clerk was sworn and testified that she had called Barnard to ask 
whether he wanted her to schedule a hearing on his objections. He 
indicated to her that he did not, so she filed the Order imposing 
sanctions, which she had been holding at Judge Murphy's direction. 
Id. at 8. Barnard was then sworn and testified that he had told 
the clerk to "go ahead and file" the Order, because he intended to 
either file a Writ of Mandamus in state court or file an action in 
federal court. Id. at 9. 
The Order imposing sanctions upon Barnard was filed in the 
Third Judicial District Court November 14, 1989. On November 22, 
1989, Barnard filed the complaint in this action, alleging that 
defendants had deprived him of his constitutional rights and 
3 
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seeking damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. The 
complaint alleges that Judge Murphy, acting under color of state 
law, deprived Barnard of his property and liberty interests without 
due process of law, and that Wassennan acted in concert with him. 
Barnard seeks judgment declaring the Order to be null and void and 
unenforceable. He further seeks damages from Wasserman, and 
attorney fees and costs against all defendants. 
Barnard now moves for judgment on the pleadings, and both 
Murphy and Wasserman have moved for summary judgment. 
Jurisdiction 
This Court must first address the threshold question whether 
it has jurisdiction in this case. The Tenth Circuit has held that 
review of state court judgments in judicial proceedings may only 
be had in the United States Supreme Court. Van Sickle v. Hollowav. 
791 F.2d 1431, 1436 (10th Cir. 1986). "Federal district courts do 
not have jurisdiction 'over challenges to state-court decisions in 
particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those 
challenges allege that the state court's action was 
unconstitutional.111 Id. (quoting District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983)). 
4 
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Defendants argue that Barnardfs § 1983 action is in fact a 
challenge to a state court proceeding, and that this Court is 
therefore without jurisdiction to hear it. They point to the fact 
that part of the remedy sought by the plaintiff is declaratory or 
injunctive relief voiding the Order entered in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Utah. 
Barnard contends this action is not an attempt to obtain 
review of a state court decision in federal court. He argues that 
he is only challenging the procedure by which the court deprived 
him of his constitutional rights; he does not seek review of the 
merits of that decision. Therefore, Barnard reasons, this case 
does not fall under the prohibition of Van Sickle and Feldman. 
Barnard relies on Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 1429 
(10th Cir. 1984), cert, denied. 471 U.S. 1016 (1985), to support 
his argument. In that case, the Tenth Circuit had before it a § 
1983 action in which an attorney sought judgment declaring that 
the Colorado procedure for disciplining attorneys violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 143 0. The 
court held that it did have jurisdiction to hear that case because 
it did not involve an attorney's challenge to particular discipline 
imposed upon him, but a "generalized constitutional attack on the 
5 
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state's rules and regulations governing discipline.11 Id. at 1432. 
The court relied on Feldman to make the distinction, holding that 
11
 in the latter kind of case, the district court is not required to 
review a state court judicial decision but rather to assess the 
validity of a rule promulgated in a non-judicial proceeding." Id. 
Barnard's interpretation of the Razatos holding does not 
withstand scrutiny. The court in that case distinguished between 
rule-making and judicial proceedings. The law simply will not fit 
Barnard's attempt to distinguish between the merits and procedure 
within a judicial proceeding. The holdings of both Razatos and Van 
Sickle are clear: a federal district court is without jurisdiction 
to review a state court judicial decision. The Order which is the 
source of Barnard's complaint is just such a judicial decision, and 
this Court therefore does not have jurisdiction to hear this case. 
Judicial Immunity 
Although we need proceed no further, the Court will 
nevertheless address the issue of judicial immunity. The value to 
the courts of being free from harassment by dissatisfied litigants 
far outweighs the danger that some wrongs may go unredressed. 
stump v, Soarkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). For that reason, "a judge 
6 
is entitled to judicial immunity if he has not acted in clear 
absence of all jurisdiction and if the act was a judicial one.11 
Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985). 
Barnard does not argue that Judge Murphy was not acting in his 
judicial capacity. Instead, he cites Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 
522 (1984) , for the proposition that judicial immunity is not a bar 
to an action for injunctive relief. Barnard again misinterprets 
the law. In Pulliam, the plaintiff sought to enjoin a state 
Magistrate from requiring bond for a nonincarcerable offense. The 
United States District Court for the District of Utah has already 
rejected the application of Pulliam to an action for an injunction 
which sought retroactive, rather than prospective, relief. Navajo 
Nation v. District Court for Utah County, 624 F.Supp. 130, 137 
(D.Utah 1985). The relief sought by Barnard is clearly retroactive 
and not prospective, and is therefore barred by judicial immunity. 
Wasserman asserts, incorrectly, that the immunity of her co-
defendant extends to the action against her. The Tenth Circuit has 
held that "the immunity of a state official will not necessarily 
protect a private individual alleged to have conspired with him." 
Shaffer v. Cook, 634 F.2d 1259, 1260 (10th Cir. 1980). However, 
7 
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Barnard has alleged no facts sufficient to establish the existence 
of a conspiracy between Wasserman and Murphy. fl[L]awyers do not 
act under color of state law solely by engaging in private 
litigation on behalf of their clients." Id. at 1261 (quoting Brown 
v. Chaffee. 612 F.2d 497, 501 (10th Cir. 1979)). In order to go 
forward in the action against her, Barnard must show that Wasserman 
reached an understanding with Murphy to deprive Barnard of his 
constitutional rights, or that she was a willful participant in a 
joint activity with Murphy. Adickes v. Kress i Co., 398 U.S. 144, 
152 (1970). All Wasserman is alleged to have done is draft a 
document embodying the Order of the court. As the Tenth Circuit 
found in Shaffer, "[n]othing in the complaint indicates that the 
court or the attorneys were acting outside the confines of the 
neutral function of a judicial forum." 634 F.2d at 1260. Barnard 
therefore has no cause of action against Wasserman. 
THEREFORE, it is 
ORDERED that plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. It is further 
ORDERED that defendants1 motion for sanctions bef and the same 
hereby is, DENIED. 
Dated this H day of May^-1990. 
a n i l i ' JUDGE, 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
8 
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en 
United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
May 8, 1990 
* * MAILING CERTIFICATE OF CLERK * * 
\: 2:89-cv-01042 
•ue and correct copies of the attached were mailed by the clerk to the 
• llowing: 
Brian M. Barnard, Esq. 
Utah Legal Clinic 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Craig Peterson, Esq. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Wendy A Faber, Esq. 
GIAUQUE, WILCOX & BENDINGER 
136 S Main Street, #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Carlie Christensen, Esq. 
230 South 500 East Suite 300 
Salt Lake City,, UT 84102 
Hon. Clarence A. Brimmer 
P.O. Box 985 
Cheyenne, WY 82001 
Markus B. Zimmer, Clerk 
U.S. District Court for District 
of Utah 
350 South Main, Room 204 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2180 
(re preparation of judgment) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND-FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANN L. WASSERMAN, 
SHIRLEY RANDAZZO, 
and 
THE HON. MICHAEL MURPHY, 
Judge of the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Case No. 900903227 CV 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
The above-captioned matter having come before the Court 
on Friday, March 22, 1991 at the hour of 8:30 a.m. for 
consideration of plaintiff's and defendant, Judge Murphy's cross-
motions for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's motion for Judgment 
On The Pleadings. Plaintiff appeared pro se. Defendant Judge 
Murphy, was represented by Carlie Christensen. Defendant 
Randazzo, did not appear in person, nor through her counsel of 
record, Ann Wasserman, nor has the defendant Randazzo filed any 
response to plaintiff's motions. The Court having heard and 
considered the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the 
legal authorities submitted by the parties, and now being fully 
,./iO,i: 
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advised in the premises, makes the following Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. This action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 
1983 challenging the constitutionality of a state court 
order issued by the Honorable Michael R. Murphy in the 
the case of Randazzo v. Randazzo. D-88-4130, a divorce 
proceeding filed in the Thrid Judicial District Court, 
State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff, Brian Barnard is an attorney admitted to 
practice law in the State of Utah and formerly counsel 
for Frank Randazzo, the defendant in the divorce 
proceeding in Thrid District Court. 
3. Defendant, Ann Wasserman is also an attorney admitted to 
practice law in Utah and counsel for Shirley Randazzo, 
the plaintiff in the divorce proceeding in Third 
District Court. 
4. Defendant, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy is a duly 
appointed and elected judge of the Third Judicial 
District Court and presided over the Randazzo case. 
5. On September 13, 1989, at aproximately 3:00 p.m., Judge 
Murphy held a hearing on a Motion for a Finding of 
Contempt filed by Shirley Randazzo. Ms. Randazzo's 
.ill/ 
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motion sought to find Frank Randazzo in contempt for 
his failure to comply with the terms of the divorce 
decree and specifically, his failure to make payments 
to Ms. Randazzo7s credit union to keep a loan obligation 
current. Ms. Randazzo and her counsel, Ann Wasserman 
were both present at the hearing. 
6. At 4:35 p.m., approximately an hour and a half after the 
hearing began, Mr. Randazzo arrived without counsel. 
Judge Murphy noted for the record that Mr. Barnard had 
previously withdrawn as counsel from the case. 
7. After reviewing the pleadings on file, the proffer of 
Ms. Randazzo's counsel and the representations of Mr. 
Randazzo, Judge Murphy found that Mr. Randazzo did not 
receive notice of the hearing; that his former counsel, 
Mr. Barnard did not give Mr. Randazzo timely notice of 
the details of the Court's decision as announced on 
August 2, 1989; and that Mr. Barnard did not forward 
copies of the proposed Findings of Fact and Divorce 
Decree to Mr. Randazzo. 
8. Based upon the foregoing, Judge Murphy concluded that 
Mr. Randazzo was not in contempt of court and ordered 
that the divorce decree be amended to require Mr. 
Randazzo to reimburse Ms. Randazzo for all monies 
expended by her as a result of Mr. Randazzo's failure 
(1(1347 
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to keep the credit union loan current, and that Mr. 
Randazzo pay to Ms. Randazzo the sum of $4 3 0.00 for 
attorney's fees incurred by her in connection with the 
contempt proceeding. Judge Murphy also ordered that 
Mr. Randazzo not pay any money to his former counsel 
until the award of attorneys' fees was paid to Ms. 
Randazzo's counsel and that money paid by Mr. Randazzo 
to Ms. Randazzo's counsel be credited, dollar for 
dollar against Mr. Randazzo's obligation to Mr. 
Barnard. 
9. On September 15, 1989, Ms. Randazzo's counsel mailed a 
copy of the proposed order to Mr. Randazzo and Mr. 
Barnard. 
10. On or about September 18, 1989, Mr. Barnard filed a 
"Motion to Vacate Order of Sanctions and Objection to 
Order" and his own affidavit in support of the motion. 
On September 20, 1989, Mr. Barnard filed a request for 
a hearing. 
11. On October 12, 1989, Judge Murphy signed the proposed 
order and directed his clerk, Marlene Bills, to hold 
the order pending resolution of Mr. Barnard's 
objections. 
12. On November 14, 1989, Mr. Barnard appeared before Judge 
Murphy as counsel for defendants in the matter of Ward 
v. Butcher, Civil No. C88-4883, a matter unrelated to 
BARNARD V WASSERMAN PAGE 5 MEMO DECISION 
the Randazzo case. At that time, Ms. Bills advised Mr. 
Barnard that Ms. Wasserman was not willing to stipulate 
to the entry of an amended order in the Randazzo matter 
and asked whether he wanted to schedule a hearing on 
his objections. Mr. Barnard advised Ms. Bills to file 
the order and that he would "take care of it another 
way". Based upon Mr. Barnard's representations, Ms. 
Bills issued a minute entry indicating that Mr. Barnard 
did not intend to have a hearing on his objections and 
that Judge Murphy's order of October 12, 1989 would be 
filed. 
13. Approximately one week later, on November 21, 1989, 
Judge Murphy held a scheduling conference in the matter 
of Ward v. Butcher. At that time, Judge Murphy 
inquired of Mr. Barnard whether Judge Murphy was named 
as a defendant in the matter of Barnard v. Wasserman 
and if so, whether Judge Murphy could continue to 
preside over the Ward case. Mr. Barnard indicated that 
unless there was a resolution to the Randazzo case, Mr. 
Barnard would be compelled to file a lawsuit. 
14. Judge Murphy then swore his clerk, Marlene Bills, 
and asked her to testify as to whether a hearing had 
been scheduled in the Randazzo matter. Ms. Bills 
testified as follows: 
00345 
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I told Mr. Barnard if Ann wasn't willing to amend 
the findings and Order, and if he wanted to 
schedule a hearing, that was fine. He indicated 
to me, "Go ahead and file then, because I'll just 
take care of it in Federal Court." After that, I 
filed the signed Findings of Fact and Order, and 
left it at that. I had been holding the papers 
for — well, since the 12th, when they were 
signed. And had been holding them and had not 
filed them until that day. 
Brian Barnard was then sworn and testified as follows: 
The conversation that your clerk related to you 
is correct, except for one particular, and that 
is I didn't make any reference to Federal Court 
at all. I said, "Go ahead and file it. I'll 
take care of it in another way." 
I also told her that I would take an S.O.B. pill 
and go after Ann Wasserman, because I didn't like 
the way Ann Wasserman had treated me. And she 
commented in a joking manner, back to me. 
Based upon Mr. Barnard's representations, Judge Murphy 
disqualified himself from further proceedings in the 
Ward matter. 
On February 9, 1990, plaintiff filed suit against Judge 
Murphy in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah challenging the constitutionality of 
the state court order issued by Judge Murphy in the 
Randazzo case. 
On May 4, 1990, the Hon. Clarence Brimmer, the Chief 
Judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Wyoming, sitting by designation, ordered that 
plaintiff's claims be dismissed for lack of subject 
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matter jurisidiction. Judge Brimmer also found that 
the relief sought by plaintiff was barred by the 
doctrine of judicial immunity• 
19. On May 31, 1990, plaintiff filed this action in the 
Third District Court against the same parties and 
based upon the same legal theories as the federal 
action which he filed. On July 17, 1990, Judge Murphy 
accepted service of the summons and complaint. 
20. Defendant Shirley Randazzo has not filed any 
responsive pleadings to plaintiff's motions. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. That this action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1983 challenging the constitutionality of a 
state court order issued by the Honorable Michael R. 
Murphy in the case of Randazzo v. Randazzo, D-88-4130, 
a divorce proceeding filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court, State of Utah. That the plaintiff in 
this action is seeking attorneys' fees and costs 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988. 
2. That judges are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 
1983 for acts committed within their judicial capacity. 
3. That a judge has acted in his judicial capacity if he 
has not acted in the clear absence of all jurisdicition 
;.fiocr -• 
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and if the act is a judicial one. Stump v. Sparkman, 
435 U.S. 34, reh. den.. 436 U.S. 951 (1978). 
4. That an act is a judicial act if it is a function 
normally performed by a judge and the parties dealt 
with the judge in his official capacity. Martinez v. 
Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985) 
5. That Judge Murphy's conduct consisted solely of 
conducting a hearing and signing and entering an order. 
That such conduct is consistent with the conduct 
normally engaged in by judges of the District Court. 
6. That the plaintiffs dealings with Judge Murphy were 
limited exclusively to actions performed by Judge 
Murphy in his judicial capacity. That plaintiff had 
no extra-judicial contact with Judge Murphy or dealt 
with the District Court in any other capacity than 
as an attorney. That the conduct in question 
consisted solely of normal judicial functions in a case 
pending before Judge Murphy and arose from dealings with 
the judge in his official capacity. 
7. That Judge Murphy's actions were judicial acts. Stump 
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 34, reh. den.. 436 U.S. 951 
(1978); Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th 
Cir. 1985). 
8. That the test for determining the application of the 
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doctrine of judicial immunity is whether there is a 
clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject 
matter and not whether the judge committed procedural 
errors. Stump v. Soarkman. 435 U.S. 349 (1978); 
Bradley v. Fisher. 13 Wall. 335 (1872). 
That the District Court has subject matter jurisdiction 
over contempt proceedings involving attorneys who 
willfully neglect or violate their duty. Utah Code 
Ann. Sections 78-3-4 and 78-32-1. 
That Judge Murphy had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the contempt proceedings against plaintiff for his 
alleged neglect in failing to inform his client of his 
responsibilities under the divorce decree. 
That any defects in the contempt procedures employed by 
Judge Murphy in the Randazzo case will not support a 
conclusion that there was a clear absence of all 
jurisdiction. Stump v Sparkman. 435 U.S. 349 (1978); 
Rolleston v. Eldriae, 848 F.2d 163 (11th Cir. 1988); 
and Williams v. Sepe. 487 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1973). 
That Judge Murphy was acting in his judicial capacity 
at the time of the alleged wrongful conduct, that all 
of his actions were judicial ones and that he did not 
act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. 
That judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective 
0(1353 
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injunctive relief against a judicial officer. Pulliam 
v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984). 
14. That plaintiff's request for injunctive and declaratory 
relief in the present case is simply an attempt to 
obtain the review and reversal of a state court order. 
Navajo Nation v. District Court for Utah County, 624 
F. Supp. 130 (D. Utah, 1985). 
15. That plaintiff's request for injunctive and declaratory 
relief is clearly retroactive and not prospective. 
Barnard v. Murphy, Civil No. 89-C-1042-B, Order on 
Motions for Summary Judgment (D. Utah, 1990). 
16. That plaintiff's request for injunctive and declaratory 
relief does not fall within the exceptional language 
contained in Pulliam. 
17. That plaintiff's claims are therefore barred by the 
doctrine of judicial immunity. 
18. That the fundamental requirement of due process of law 
is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 
U.S. 545, 552 (1965). 
19. That the presumption against a claimed waiver of 
constitutional rights can be overcome upon a showing of 
a valid waiver. Pitts v. Board of Education of U.S.D. 
305. Salina. Kansas, 869 F.2d 555, 557 (10th Cir. 
0(1354 
BARNARD V WASSERMAN PAGE 11 MEMO DECISION 
1989); Johnnson v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 734 
F.2d 774, 784 (11th Cir. 1984). 
20. That the determination as to whether a valid waiver 
exists depends upon whether there was an intentional 
abandonment or relinquishment of a known right. 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Edwards 
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981). 
21. That a determination as to whether there was an 
intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a known 
right, in turn, depends upon whether the party 
understood his rights, and whether he knowingly and 
voluntarily waived them. Ostlund v. Bob, 825 F.2d 
1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987); Sassower v. Sheriff of 
Westchester Co.. 824 F.2d 184, 190 (2nd Cir. 1987). 
22. That plaintiff understood that he had the right to be 
heard inasmuch as he filed a written request for a 
hearing. 
23. That plaintiff voluntarily waived that right when he 
advised Judge Murphy's clerk to enter the order and 
informed her that he would "take care of it in another 
way". 
24. That plaintiff knowingly waived that right inasmuch as 
plaintiff is an attorney who practices extensively in 
the area of civil rights litigation, that he is 
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informed about individual constitutional rights and the 
consequences of waiving those rights, and that he is 
retained by others to offer his professional judgment 
on the exercise and waiver of those rights. 
That plaintiff's direction to Judge Murphy's clerk to 
enter the order and his statement that he would "take 
care of it in another way" were made with the 
understanding and knowledge that he would not recieve a 
hearing prior to the entry of the order. 
That once a state has provided a procedure for 
remedying a perceived wrong, a civil rights complainant 
is obligated to avail himself of those remedies, and if 
the complainant's due process rights are waived. 
Weinrauch v. Park Citv, 751 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 
1984); Riggins v. Board of Regents of the University 
of Nebraska. 790 F.2d 707, 712 (8th Cir. 1986); and 
Jacobus v. Hevdiner, 643 F.Supp. 550 (S.D.W.Va. 1986). 
That plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to be heard 
on his objections to the order and to remedy the 
perceived wrong, that plaintiff was obligated to avail 
himself of that remedy, and that plaintiff's decision 
not to utilize the procedure offered constitutes a 
waiver of plaintiff's due process rights. 
That where a state can feasibly provide a pre-
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deprivation hearing before taking a constitutionally 
protected property or liberty interest, it generally 
must do so regardless of the adequacy of the post-
deprivation remedy. Zinermon v. Burch, U.S. , 
110 S.Ct. 975 (1990). 
29. That plaintiff was not deprived of a constitutionally 
protected interest by the signing of Judge Murphy's 
October 12, 1989 order. 
30. That it was the entry of Judge Murphy's order which 
gave rise to the alleged deprivation of plaintiff's 
property and liberty interests. 
31. That until Judge Murphy entered the order, its contents 
were not a matter of public record nor was Shirley 
Randazzo, the plaintiff in the Third District Court 
divorce proceeding, able to enforce it. 
32. That plaintiff was not deprived of any property 
interest or liberty interest in his name and reputation 
until the order was entered. 
33. That plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to be heard 
on his objections prior to the entry of Judge Murphy's 
order. 
34. That it was plaintiff's own direction to Judge Murphy's 
clerk to enter Judge Murphy's order, that resulted in 
its entry without further hearing. 
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35. That plaintiff did not suffer any deprivation of a 
constitutionally protected interest until Judge Murphy 
entered his order; that plaintiff had the opportunity, 
prior to the entry of that order, to be heard on his 
objections; that said opportunity constituted a pre-
deprivation remedy consistent with Zinermon and was 
constitutionally sufficient and that plaintiff waived 
that opportunity. 
ORDER 
1. Plaintiffs motion for Summary Judgment against 
defendant Shirley Randazzo is granted. The motion is 
unopposed. 
2. Defendants' motion for Summary Judgment against 
plaintiff is granted on the doctrines of Judicial 
Immunity, Res Judicata and Waiver. 
3. All other pending motions are denied as moot. 
Dated this ^ day of April, 1991. 
PAT B. BRIAN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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